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a PAW web exclusive column
November
21, 2001:
Fixing the Bureau
Suggestions from a long-time observer, Clifford Karchmer '68
By Tom Nugent
While half a dozen different
congressional and independent inquiries press forward with detailed
studies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's performance in
recent years, a Princeton-educated researcher on law enforcement
management systems suggests that what the FBI needs most right now
is a leader who can "change the management structure by changing
the culture."
"I agree with many
others that the Bureau needs comprehensive, broad-based reform of
its headquarters management apparatus, and I'm convinced that Bob
Mueller '66 was the perfect choice to make that happen," says
Clifford Karchmer '68, the director of program development for the
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a Washington-based law enforcement
think-tank that routinely works with many Justice Department agencies.
"I am confident
that the American people will be surprised at how successful Mueller
is at fixing the managerial problems at the FBI," says Karchmer,
who has spent 30 years advising local, state, and federal crime-fighters
on improving their strategic and operational structures. "Mueller's
performance as a U.S. attorney in two jurisdictions and as a powerfully
effective administrator in the Department of Justice shows that
he knows how to analyze ñ and then reorganize ñ bureaucratic
systems that have become static and unresponsive.
"The FBI has done
many things very well. They've done a terrific job ending traditional
Mafia dominance of organized crime, for example. But what they need
most right now is a dynamic manager ñ a savvy and sophisticated
administrator who can upgrade their technology base and improve
operating efficiency, even as he inspires morale and loyalty at
every level of management. And that will be very difficult."
According to Karchmer,
who has served as an expert witness on money-laundering enforcement
before the President's Commission on Organized Crime, "The
FBI's managerial leadership in the past has been drawn from some
of the very best religiously affiliated schools, such as Georgetown
University.
"But now they're
getting [in Mueller] a new kind of leader at the Bureau ñ
an Ivy Leaguer with the kind of intellectual credentials and activist
resume they haven't often seen before. Will he be seen as an outsider?
I don't think so, because Mueller has put in long hours on many
Justice Department investigations, and he has taken the initiative
to defend the Bureau when others were conspicuously silent. Moreover,
he's also a decorated Marine, which the seriously patriotic Bureau
agents respect. And everybody knows he's graduated from real-life
trenches, first in combat as a platoon leader, and then as a federal
prosecutor with an enviable track record. They also know what he
did as a prosecutor in the Pan Am bombing case, in the Manual Noriega
drug conspiracy case, and in a host of other high-profile cases.
"For all of these
reasons, the rank and file FBI agents will grow to respect him,
if large numbers do not already. My view is that Bob Mueller has
a rare opportunity to accomplish true structural reform of the FBI,
and I'm sure he's going to go after the job in customary Princeton
fashion ñ which is to roll up your sleeves and then demonstrate
extreme competence in the most self-effacing, intellectually unpretentious
way."
Here are a few other
suggestions from Karchmer, based on his three decades of working
with the FBI on research and other projects involving several problems
of mutual interest.
1.) Begin by reading
some books about problems endemic to large, secretive public bureaucracies.
You might start with Max Weber and Anthony Downs. And be sure to
include James Q. Wilson's The Investigators, which contains one
of the few on-target analyses of FBI procedures. I believe the answers
to the FBI's internal problems lie in historical analyses of intelligence
failures ñ not in re-examining J. Edgar Hoover's personal
excesses. (One classic is the study of Pearl Harbor by the Wohlstetters.
Another valuable document is Graham Allison's Essence of Decision,
which focuses on the bureaucratic pathologies that prevent agencies
like the FBI, CIA, and others from communicating on common problems.)
2.) Consider that most
journalistic "analyses" of the FBI are devoted to completing
any remaining deconstruction of J. Edgar Hoover that previous authors
somehow missed. You won't find much objectivity here. Except for
an autobiography written by one of Hoover's ex-aides, William Turner
(My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI), these books will probably not
help you identify what is needed to fix the Bureau.
3.) But if you insist
on reading the historical accounts of the FBI, at least commit to
spending some quality time pondering why so much of what Hoover
accomplished manages to endure. Shrinking or not, his legacy still
inspires many agents. Why? Hoover managed to create a large, virtually
corruption-free bureaucracy, and a bureaucracy that has withstood
many of the partisan political forces of the times. Hoover really
did understand how to motivate an enormous law enforcement institution
to function according to prevailing public expectations of efficiency
and effectiveness, and with a degree of quality control across the
nation that is probably unequaled in the rest of the government.
The point is not to find some pretext for praising Hoover, but rather
to identify constructive ways to revive that quality control apparatus
and make if work for the very different objectives that the FBI
now must pursue ñ and not just to salvage its reputation,
but quite possibly to save the nation.
4.) Tomorrow, convene
an informal panel of respected, retired FBI division and section
chiefs. Listen to the managers of diverse Bureau specialties: inspection,
civil rights, national security, organized crime, etc. Ask them
point-blank about inefficiencies they found but were unable to correct,
and how they would recommend that you accomplish those changes today.
In other words, ask them for a roadmap they have drawn mentally
but dared not forward up the command chain. I think you'll be surprised
at how insightful these ex-officials are and how well they've thought
through the same problems you now confront. Reportedly, no former
FBI director has ever tapped this resource of respected retirees.
Can this "brain trust" help you implement and institutionalize
your reforms?
5.) Starting next Monday,
advocate for repeal of the post-Hoover law that mandates retirement
at age 57. Although there are waivers here and there, this is the
root of the "brain drain" that deprives the FBI of talented
managers at the height of their service and maturity. This ill-conceived
post-Hoover reform was intended to prevent the regrowth of old-boy
inner circles. Unfortunately, this "reform" has managed
to deprive the FBI of precisely the kind of seasoned managers that
it needs, and has perpetuated a mid-career out-placement focus that
shifts the attention of Bureau managers to high-paying private sector
jobs at a very sensitive time in their careers.
6.) Reread the Congressional
record surrounding the post-Watergate movement to enact an FBI Charter.
The fact that Congress ultimately rejected a presidentially backed
and widely popular (and very rational) statutory charter speaks
volumes about the ability of one person ñ FBI Director William
Webster ñ to build enough credibility so that critics became
convinced that he was capable of rectifying longstanding abuses
without the prodding of a new, highly proscriptive law.
7.) Work with Congress
to transform the process of congressional oversight from an exercise
that has naively second-guessed FBI administrators and erected an
obstacle course of "don't you dare" proscriptions to a
set of positive goals with which the nation can identify and you
believe you can reach in your single ten-year term.
8.) Get your hands on
the Presidential Transition Team briefing books for the FBI for
the last four presidents. They should provide good catalogues of
organizational issues and first drafts of marching orders. Compare
those expectations to what eventually occurred, and I believe you
will appreciate how critical events wound up short-circuiting the
most well intended courses of action. Above all, ask yourself: "How
will my tenure be different, when other directors of considerable
talent and unquestioned dedication watched their own efforts fall
short?"
Tom Nugent is a freelance
writer and can be reached at "Tom Nugent" <paw@Princeton.edu>
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