

# Legislatures and Regime Survival: Why Strong Authoritarian Institutions Help Democratization

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## Abstract

This paper examines how authoritarian legislative institutions affect regime survival. I argue that authoritarian legislatures and party systems, even when devised to quell threats from authoritarian rivals, can influence the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy. When legislative institutions and party systems help protect the interests of authoritarian elites in new democracies, these institutions increase the likelihood of democratization. Accounting for selection and using a multinomial choice model on a data set of 200 authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1950 to 2002, I find that authoritarian legislatures decrease the probability of being replaced by a subsequent authoritarian regimes in all regime types, but increase the probability of democratization in military and single party regimes, and when the dictator does not have access to abundant natural resource rents.

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Recently, scholars have begun to look systematically at authoritarian political institutions such as parties, legislatures, and elections (Brownlee 2007, Boix 2003, Gandhi forthcoming, Gandhi & Przeworski 2007, Gandhi & Przeworski 2006, Geddes 2005, Geddes 1999, Smith 2005). In this article, I explore how authoritarian legislatures affect the survival of authoritarian regimes, distinguishing between two types of authoritarian failure: transition to a subsequent dictatorship and democratization.

Legislative institutions in authoritarian regimes can help sustain the dictator in power by making the dictator's promises to potential authoritarian rivals more credible. Accordingly, these institutions decrease the likelihood of being replaced by a rival dictator. However, I argue that legislative institutions and party systems can also affect the likelihood of democracy by influencing the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy. Relative to other types of regimes, party elites in dominant single party regimes with institutionalized party systems are much more likely to participate in and win competitive post-authoritarian elections, preserving some modicum of power for themselves in a new democracy. In military regimes, elites use institutionalized legislatures and party systems to guarantee their corporate interests are protected after a transition to democracy. In both cases, because authoritarian legislatures and party systems can guarantee at least some of the interests of the outgoing elites, these institutions make a transition to democracy more likely, all else equal. To test these expectations about how legislative institutions and party systems influence survival, I model both transitions to a subsequent dictatorship and transitions to a new democracy.

The argument that authoritarian legislative institutions can help protect the interests of authoritarian elites in a subsequent democracy builds on some of the most influential research on comparative democratization in recent years (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, 2006, Boix 2003, Robinson 2006). Building on the insights of the Meltzer-Richard model (1981),<sup>1</sup> this literature posits that structural characteristics of the economy, such as income inequality or asset mobility, can deter taxation of the rich in a democracy. When relatively high equality or dependence on mobile assets constrain taxation of the rich in a democracy, elite interests are better protected and democratization is more likely.

There are numerous cases of democratization, however, in countries with both high income inequality and low asset mobility – for example, the transitions from military rule in many Central American countries. To understand democratization in these countries, we might consider that military elites may not always view guarantees of modest taxation as the necessary condition for ceding power to democrats. Rather, their chief concern may be protecting the military's corporate interests, such as securing ample military budgets and immunity from human rights prosecution. Insofar as authoritarian political institutions can influence the distribution of power in a post-authoritarian democracy to help protect these interests, these institutions can make democratization more likely.

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<sup>1</sup>The implications of this model suggest that the (poor) median voter in a democracy should set a higher tax rate than rich elites in a dictatorship. Therefore, the rich should resist democracy because they face a higher tax rate under democracy.

By considering the role of institutions in protecting authoritarian elites' interests, we can expand the purview of authoritarian elites beyond simply the "rich" to incorporate authoritarian regimes with diverse political coalitions of support where, for example, elites represent (relatively poor) ethnic majorities (UMNO in Malaysia) or (rural and urban) labor (PRI in Mexico for many decades). In doing so, we can relax the redistributive constraints of the Meltzer-Richard model without losing its key implication: authoritarian elites are more likely to cede to a transition to democracy when their interests are better protected in a new democracy. In this formulation, "interests" no longer need be constrained to "low taxes," but can encompass a diverse array of concerns, from the military immunity (Guatemala) to the preservation of ethnic group priorities (Malaysia).

In the first section, I present a static model of democratization to frame the discussion of how authoritarian legislative institutions influence the two distinct types of authoritarian failure: transition to a subsequent dictatorships and democratization.<sup>2</sup> I then discuss the types of dictatorships that are likely to have legislative institutions and party systems which exert influence over the distribution of power in a new democracy. In the third section, I discuss the data and methods used to test the main hypotheses. I then present the results of a multinomial logit model of regime duration, as well as results from a selection model that accounts for the unobserved factors that may lead dictators to create and maintain a legislature. I conclude with a brief discussion of the results and implications for future research.

## Legislatures and authoritarian survival

In this section, I present a simple game to illustrate the distinct channels through which authoritarian legislative institutions influence the survival of dictators. In doing so, this game distinguishes how legislatures affect two types of authoritarian regime failure: (1) being replaced by a rival dictator and (2) democratization.

First the dictator (D) democratizes or not:  $d \in (0, 1)$ . If the dictator democratizes ( $d = 1$ ), s/he faces a relatively free and fair election where the winner of the election sets the distribution of income at  $(D_C, D_D)$ . This distribution from elections incorporates the probabilities that allies of authoritarian elites (or elites themselves) will win power. If the dictator does not democratize ( $d = 0$ ), s/he sets the distribution of income at  $(A_C, A_D)$  and the citizens (C) decide whether to fight or not fight ( $f \in (0, 1)$ ). If the citizens fight, conflict ensues with the the payoff  $(R_C, R_D)$  - which incorporates the respective costs and probabilities of victory in the conflict. If the citizens do not fight, the dictator re-sets the initial distribution to a more favorable distribution  $(A'_C, A'_D)$  with probability  $1 - p$ . The initial distribution  $(A_C, A_D)$  obtains with a probability  $p$ . This game is no different than the one in Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) and captures the main strategies that comprise many games of democratization that entail conflict between two players (e.g. rich and


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<sup>2</sup>I use *authoritarian regime* and *dictatorship* interchangeably.

poor; dictator and citizens; government and insurgents) (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, 2006; Boix 2003; Robinson 2006; Wood 2000).

One view of authoritarian legislatures argues that these institutions neutralize threats from groups outside the regime by incorporating them into the governing structure of regime itself (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). One way to map this intuition onto this game is to view legislatures as increasing the probability ( $p$ ) that the dictator does not renege on the initial distribution of income. Using Acemoglu and Robinson's logic, for the dictator to stay in power and prevent a conflict, s/he can set an initial distribution in which the citizens (at least those with sufficient power to initiate a conflict and potentially replace the dictator) receive just enough utility to forgo conflict. However, this initial distribution may not be credible, as the dictator can renege on this initial (enticing) distribution and re-set the distribution in her/his favor:  $A_C > A'_C$  and  $A'_D > A_D$ . The uncertainty over whether the dictator will renege is captured by  $p$ . The view of legislatures as broadening the basis of regime support suggests that the presence of a legislature (L) increases  $p$ :  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial L} > 0$ . Legislatures give outside groups a stake in the regime and provide a credible guarantee that the regime will not renege on promises to forgo predation or hand out future rents, thereby increasing the cooperation of these groups.

## Conflict and Democratization



D  $\equiv$  Dictator; C  $\equiv$  Citizen; N  $\equiv$  Nature

In the game depicted in Figure 1, two conditions need to hold for democratization to prevail:

$$R_C > pA_C + (1 - p)A'_C \quad (1)$$

$$D_D > R_D \quad (2)$$

Rearranging the first condition ( $R_C > A'_C + p(A_C - A'_C)$ ), we can see that an increase in  $p$  makes (1) less likely to hold.<sup>3</sup> So to the extent that legislative institutions in dictatorships lend credibility to the dictator's promise not to predate (or re-set the initially conflict-preventing distribution), legislative institutions should reduce the likelihood of democratization.

This logic, of course, works equally well if we simply look at the right side of the game tree (in red) in Figure 1, where democratization is not an option for the dictator. A game without the democratization option probably captures the interaction between the dictator and the potential authoritarian rivals more accurately than a game with democratization. In this scenario, when playing against rival (would-be) dictators who cannot be appeased by democracy, the payoffs to conflict for the dictator in power might be considerably smaller than the payoff from the same outcome in a game played against would-be democrats. That is, losing a conflict with democrats might be more palatable than losing a conflict to a rival dictator.<sup>4</sup> Looking only at the right side of Figure 1, the dictator still stays in power by offering a large enough distribution (with sufficient credibility) to potential rivals to forestall a revolt:  $R_C < A'_C + p(A_C - A'_C)$ . So whether the dictator is playing this game against opponents for whom democratization is an enticing outcome (the full game in Figure 1) or against (rival authoritarian) opponents for whom conflict and replacing the current dictator is the only relevant option (the right side of Figure 1), legislatures that increase the credibility of the current dictator's promises should increase her/his chances of staying in power.

However, there is a second avenue through which authoritarian legislative institutions might enter the game: authoritarian legislative institutions and party systems can often influence the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy. For example, in dominant single party regimes, legislatures and party systems often entail large distributional networks and mass support, which translate into more effective voter mobilization and a larger claim on power in a new democracy. Because of the electoral success of former authoritarian parties in new democracies, the interests of these elites are better protected after a transition than if the former authoritarian elites had no

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<sup>3</sup>This illustrates the trade-off between  $p$  and  $A_C$ : if having a legislature can increase  $p$ , then a smaller initial (enticing) distribution ( $A_C$ ) is required to forestall revolt.

<sup>4</sup>If  $R_D$  the game played only with rival dictators (in red) is larger than  $R_D$  in a game played against potential democrats (full Figure 1), then this suggests that the second condition necessary for democratization  $D_D > R_D$  may be more likely to obtain, all else equal, if the dictator is playing both games simultaneously. That is, the dictator may be weighing  $D_D$  (in the entire game) against some  $R_D$  in the game played in red. In this scenario, the dictator might use democratization as a method to pre-empt conflict with a rival dictator.

legislature and party structure.<sup>5</sup> Further, we know that many military regimes strike bargains with civilian elites during a transition in an attempt to guarantee their interests with political parties that are likely to do well in a subsequent democratic election (Karl 1990, Colomer 2000). The institutionalization of an authoritarian legislature and party system under military rule can increase the likelihood an ally of the military will be elected as president in the subsequent election, particularly if the military uses the authoritarian institutions to influence the selection of electoral rules in an ensuing democracy. If authoritarian legislative institutions and party systems can help protect the interests of authoritarian elites in a new democracy, then these institutions can increase the likelihood of democratization. In the game in Figure 1, authoritarian legislatures may increase the value of  $D_D$ :  $\frac{\partial D_D}{\partial L} > 0$ .

If the dictator uses legislative institutions to simply placate the demands (or ensure the cooperation) of authoritarian rivals, as in the sub-game depicted on the right side of Figure 1, then we should observe legislatures decreasing the likelihood of being deposed by a rival dictator.

**Hypothesis 1:** Legislatures decrease the likelihood of an authoritarian regime being replaced by a subsequent (rival) dictatorship.

In the democratization game, though, the effect of legislatures on democratization is twofold:  $\frac{\partial D_D}{\partial L}$  and  $-(A_C - A'_C)(\frac{\partial p}{\partial L})$ . The net effect of legislatures on democratization (in a game played against those who could be placated by democracy), therefore, is more likely to be positive when: (1) the technology which allows legislatures to protect elite interests in a subsequent democracy ( $\frac{\partial D_D}{\partial L}$ ) is larger; (2) the initial (enticing) distribution ( $A_C$ ) is *smaller*; and (3) the technology that allows legislatures to credibly commit to the initial distribution ( $\frac{\partial p}{\partial L}$ ) is smaller. In the next section, I discuss how different types of authoritarian regimes are likely to vary across the first two of these parameters, and in doing so, circumscribe when we should expect legislatures to increase the likelihood of democratization.

## Authoritarian regimes and legislatures

In this section, I first discuss the types of dictatorships that are likely to have legislative institutions and party systems that exert influence over the distribution of power in a new democracy – either directly, by building and winning electoral support, or indirectly, by shaping the governing institutions (including electoral rules) for a new democracy. Second, I argue that because resource-rich dictators are more likely to use lump-sum payments or rents to survive in power by paying off potential authoritarian rivals, these dictatorships typically have larger initial distributions ( $A_C$ ) than

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<sup>5</sup>There is considerable variation in the electoral success of former authoritarian parties in democratic elections; but a full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, see Grzymala-Busse (2002).

resource-poor dictatorships. If this is true, then legislatures in resource-poor dictatorships (smaller  $A_C$ ) should increase the likelihood of democratization.

## **Legislatures and post-authoritarian power**

Scholars have long distinguished amongst different types of authoritarian regimes and frequently acknowledge that personalist regimes differ from other types of authoritarian rule (e.g. military, single-party, totalitarian, or corporatist) (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, Geddes 1999, Linz & H.E. Chehabi 1998, Jackson & Rosberg 1982, Wintrobe 1998). Researchers have also found that distinguishing amongst different types of dictatorships has been useful for understanding how and when dictatorships transition to democracy (Geddes 1999, Bratton & van de Walle 1997) and when and with whom dictatorships initiate conflict (Peceny & Sanchez-Terry 2002, Lai & Slater 2006). The theoretical underpinnings of these empirical findings focus on institutional differences amongst regimes. For example, Reiter & Stam (2003) show that personalist dictators are more likely to initiate a war with democracies because they are institutionally unconstrained and therefore “unlikely to lose power if they launch an unsuccessful diplomatic challenge or even a losing war short of catastrophic defeat.” Summing up these differences, Geddes (2003) argues that the institutional feature that distinguishes personalist regimes from others is that “although personalist regimes have parties and militaries, these organizations have not become sufficiently developed or autonomous to prevent the leader from taking personal control of policy decisions and selection of regime personnel.” Distinct from other types of authoritarian regimes where dictators build mass (party) political support through the provision targeted public goods (dominant party regimes) or govern by repression (military regimes), the basic method of rule in personalist regimes is simply the exchange of particularistic material rewards (private goods) to a select group of regime insiders in return for mobilizing political support (Bratton & van de Walle 1994). Here I argue that because legislative institutions and party systems are typically quite weak and dependent on the dictator in personalistic regimes, they are less likely to influence the distribution of power after a transition to democracy than these same institutions in other types of regimes.

In personalist regimes, the dictator creates a legislature not to share power with strong, organized parties or to constrain himself, but to reward and punish elites who challenge him (Okar 2005; Wiarda 1968, 1975; Wright 2008).<sup>6</sup> The dictator can use the legislature to sanction a legislative member who reneges on supporting the dictator, which can serve as a deterrent to others. On the flip side, the legislature also gives the dictator a forum to publicly resuscitate a former member of the inner circle. In the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo used the legislature to routinely sanction and resuscitate potential rivals. Any cabinet member he suspected of becoming too pow-

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<sup>6</sup>Personalist dictators also frequently lack complete control over the military. Indeed, military officers are often the potential rivals the personalist dictator needs to pay off to survive.

erful or too contrarian was sent to Congress to demonstrate his loyalty to Trujillo.<sup>7</sup> Over time, too much turnover in the legislature weakened this accountability mechanism. As Trujillo's grip on power declined, he shuffled legislators through the door at a pace that quickly descended into a hyper-inflationary spiral of legislative turnover.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Hastings Banda used the legislature in Malawi in a very similar manner, and even resuscitated his once imprisoned (and popular) former Vice President when it became apparent Banda was going to face a competitive multiparty election in 1994.<sup>9</sup> These leaders used legislatures to pit potential rivals, who at various times were also crucial supporters, against one another in competition for blandishments from the dictator. Legislatures in these regimes typically did not incubate political constituencies or strong parties with enough lasting power to exert influence of over the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy.

Elites in institutionalized, dominant single party regimes, on the other hand, frequently participate and win power in post-transition elections. Institutionalization of power in a legislature during the authoritarian period in these regimes helps build mass parties and long-term electoral constituencies which can help protect the interests of authoritarian elites after a transition to democracy. Elites in military regimes, on the other hand, rarely directly participate in post-transition electoral politics. But the institutionalization of a legislature and party system during the period of military rule can nonetheless help preserve the military's corporate interests in a new democracy, because these institutions can both increase the likelihood military allies will be elected in a new democracy and help shape the new electoral rules - often through constituent assemblies.

### **Single party regimes**

An important feature of single party regimes is their extensive patronage networks, which help the party mobilize votes. Most single party regimes have legislatures (over 85% of country-years), and those that do not are less likely to have the mass party organizations that reach large segments of the population and penetrate many civil society organizations characteristic of most single party regimes.<sup>10</sup> While single party regimes without legislatures may exert just as much centralized power over the state and citizens as single party regimes with legislatures, the contention here is that those with legislatures have larger distributional networks and hence more mass support, which should

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<sup>7</sup>Wiarda (1975) writes, "[t]he Congress also served as a dumping grounds for out-of-favor Trujillo cronies, as an agency where they could demonstrate their continued loyalty and perhaps be "rehabilitated" and restored to favor." (p.1262)

<sup>8</sup>Wiarda (1968) notes that during Trujillo's first term, only two of 12 Senators and 19 of 33 Deputies "resigned." In his second term, the Senate saw 12 resignations for 13 seats and 46 resignations for 35 lower house seats. In his third term, 32 Senators (19 seats) and 122 Deputies (42 seats) "resigned."

<sup>9</sup>Decalo (1998) writes of Banda's usefulness in rotating legislators in and out of the legislature: "every year between 1970 and 1980 an average of seven Malawi constituencies remained unrepresented in Parliament due to expulsions; and of the 150 members expelled during 1964-1981, forty ended up in prison." (p.68)

<sup>10</sup>Single party regimes without legislatures include: Algeria 1965-1976, Bolivia 1953-1954, Burundi 1968-1987, Iraq 1969-1979, Laos 1985-1990, Lesotho 1970-1986, Panama 1968-77, Rwanda 1974-1988. A quick comparison of these regimes with the mass party organization of the PRI in Mexico or the CCM in Tanzania suggests that the latter parties (with legislatures) had much more extensive distribution networks and voter mobilization reach.

translate into more effective voter mobilization should the regime democratize.

Table 1: The Fate of Former Single Party Regimes after Democratic Transition

Country	Transition			
	Year	Dominant	Winner	Competitive
Albania	1991	0	1	1
Belarus	1994	0	1	1
Bulgaria	1990	0	1	1
Congo Br	1992	0	1	1
Czechoslovakia	1990	0	0	1
El Salvador*	1984	1	1	1
Hungary	1990	0	1	1
Indonesia	1998	0	1	1
Ivory Coast	1999	0	0	1
Kenya	2002	0	0	1
Mexico	2000	0	1	1
Moldova	1996	1	1	1
Mongolia	1991	1	1	1
Nicaragua	1990	0	0	1
Paraguay	1993	1	1	1
Poland	1989	1	1	1
Romania	1990	0	1	1
Senegal	2000	0	1	1
South Africa	1994	0	0	1
Taiwan	2000	0	1	1
Zambia	1991	0	0	1
Total		5	15	21

Dominant=Sweep legislative elections since transition. Winner=At a minimum, the party with the highest (plurality) share of seats in a lower house election. Competitive=At a minimum, party with the second largest share of seats in a lower house election. \*ARENA and PCN.

In contrast to other types of authoritarian regimes, when single party regimes democratize, former authoritarian parties participate in elections in the subsequent democracy and often do quite well. In Table 3, I list all the independent single-party (or single-party hybrid regimes) in the data set that democratized. All former single parties were competitive, winning at least the second largest share of seats in at least one lower house legislative election after the transition to democracy, and the vast majority (15 of 21) won at least once.<sup>11</sup> Five of the parties still dominate their multiparty democracy, having won all the lower house legislative elections since the transition.

<sup>11</sup>As an example of the “winner” category, recall that in Mexico while the PRI candidate lost to the PAN candidate in the presidential election in 2000 and placed third in 2006, the PRI won the largest share of votes in the lower house in 2003.

This strategy of building electoral support during authoritarian rule is not exclusive to dominant single party regimes. In Brazil, for example, the military used the legislature and party system to foster electoral support through patronage in a manner very similar to what we see in single party regimes. In response to the electoral defeat of the military-backed party (ARENA) in 1974, the military substantially increased public spending to win back electoral support (Hunter 1997, p. 103). This patronage system would prove useful in electing candidates sympathetic to the military, guaranteeing military prerogatives such as funding for the military, after the transition to democracy.<sup>12</sup>

If the existence of a legislature is a good proxy for a well-institutionalized mass party organization, then elites from single party regimes with legislatures should do relatively well in free and fair multiparty elections, which in turn reduces the cost of democratization relative to not having a legislature. A single party regime without a legislature will therefore be more reluctant to democratize because it has a less extensive patronage infrastructure, and thus lacks the expectation of mass support.

### **Military regimes and democratization**

Military regimes stand apart from other types of authoritarian regimes because military elites may not necessarily want to maximize their stay in power. Rather, their highest priorities are often: maintaining military unity, maximizing military budgets, keeping civilian leaders from interfering in their internal affairs, and guaranteeing immunity from human rights prosecution (Finer 1975, Nordlinger 1997, Geddes 1999). Thus, unlike other types of regimes, they may not be averse to democratization *if they can guarantee their corporate interests in the subsequent democracy*. If this is true, then the existence of a legislature decreases the costs of democratizing for the military, thus making them more likely to democratize, all else equal.

Many militaries make bargains with civilian elites which lead to democratization (Karl 1990, Colomer 2000). These deals are more credible when the military regime has a legislature and permits semi-competitive elections, for three reasons. First, the military can pinpoint which parties are likely to win subsequent democratic elections. This ensures that the military bargains with right people. Many militaries in Central and South America made bargains with parties they expected to win the first round of elections.<sup>13</sup>

Second, permitting a legislature and semi-competitive party system during the authoritarian period increases the likelihood an ally of the military will be elected as president in the subsequent election. The military can form a close alliance with an existing political party during the authoritarian period, as was the case in Guatemala in 1985 with the election of Christian Democratic candidate Cerezo Arévalo. Or the military can stand up a candidate from its own ranks, as the South Korean

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<sup>12</sup>Many ARENA legislators left the party after 1985, leading to the demise of ARENA, but these legislators often found homes in other parties (Hagiopan 1990).

<sup>13</sup>Karl (1990) codes Colombia (1958), Chile (1998), Uruguay (1984), and Venezuela (1958), as pacted transitions to democracy. However, the military also bargained with political party elites over military prerogatives in El Salvador (1982), Guatemala (1985) and Honduras (1982) (Williams and Walter 1997, Schirmer 1998, Ruhl 1997).

and Venezuelan militaries did in 1987 and 1958, respectively. South Korean general Roh Tae-woo won the presidency when the opposition split their vote, while Venezuelan Admiral Larrazábal narrowly lost an election he expected to win.<sup>14</sup> Without the previous authoritarian legislature and party system, the military would have had no knowledge of the likely success of their candidate in a relatively free and fair election. In South Korea, therefore, the multiparty election of Roh Tae-woo allowed the military to both democratize and preserve its institutional interests.<sup>15</sup>

A third mechanism through which legislatures in military regimes can preserve their power after a transition is by influencing the composition of constituent assemblies. Post-authoritarian electoral rules are often chosen in constituent assemblies elected before the transition (Guatemala, Honduras) or by the first democratic legislature acting as a constituent assembly (Brazil).<sup>16</sup> When the military has permitted prior party activity and especially when military-backed patronage parties have developed under military rule, these constituent assemblies are more likely to have significant representation from parties allied with the military.

For example, in 1957, Argentines elected members to a Constituent Assembly which restored the 1853 Constitution and the Electoral College for electing the president.<sup>17</sup> In this election, the two Radical parties (UCRP and UCRI) won over 45% of the vote, while the Peronists, still an illegal party, registered about half as many blank ballots (Potash 1959). The return of the Electoral College resulted in the military's preferred outcome in 1958, when the Radical candidate, Arturo Frondizi, was elected. The Electoral College almost worked again in the military's favor in the 1973 Presidential election. The military hoped that the Peronist candidate would fail to win 50% of the vote in the first round, prompting a run-off where a united anti-Peronist candidate could challenge the Peronist candidate (Padilla 1986, Negretto 2006).<sup>18</sup> In Guatemala in 1984, the military oversaw the election of a Constituent Assembly which wrote the new constitution under which all elections since have been conducted. The military-allied Christian Democrats won the largest share of seats in the Constituent Assembly, while the Social Democrats sat out the election entirely. In both the Argentine (1958) and Guatemalan cases, opposition parties were banned from participating in the Constituent Assembly elections, and the military succeeded in using elected Constituent assemblies to write the new electoral rules in their favor.

The Thai military has transitioned to democratic rule three times between 1973 and 1992. Previous to two of these transitions (1988 and 1992), the military stood up a legislature and allowed political parties to compete in elections. The Constituent Assemblies that wrote the electoral rules

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<sup>14</sup>The *New York Times* reported that a pre-election survey predicted Larrazábal to defeat both the Acción Democrática (Rómulo Betancourt) and COPEI (Rafael Caldera) candidates (Kantor 1959). Both the poll and military were wrong; Betancourt won with 47% of the vote, ending military rule.

<sup>15</sup>Croissant argues that Roh Tae-woo "personally guaranteed the protection of the military's interests, values, and political status." (2004, p. 371)

<sup>16</sup>I am grateful to for pointing this out to me.

<sup>17</sup>Peronists had replaced the Electoral College with a simple plurality system in 1949 (Negretto 2006).

<sup>18</sup>The Radical candidate, however, dropped out the race after the Personists won 49.5% of the vote.

used in the subsequent democratic periods were dominated by military backed parties and the military came very close to getting their preferred candidate in office during the subsequent democratic periods (King 1992; King & LoGerfo 1996). Preceding the democratic transition in 1973, however, the military had mostly functioned without a legislature. They banned all political parties for nearly ten years (1958-1968) and only reluctantly stood up a legislature for less than three years (1968-1971) after the Constitution had sat untouched in the Constituent Assembly for nearly eight years (Mezey 1973). Far from giving the generals confidence that relatively free and fair elections would not endanger their corporate interests, this legislature prompted the military to shut it down in 1971. The military did not cede power to civilians until nearly half a million protesters flooded the streets of Bangkok and over 1500 deaths brought down the regime in 1973 (Zimmerman 1974). To resolve the ensuing political crisis in late 1973, the King picked a constitutional assembly which in turn selected the first legislature – one largely absent any military-backed parties. After mostly opposing the legislature (1958-1968, 1971-1973) and otherwise abusing it (1969-1971), the military had very little say in the ensuing democracy after the transition in 1973. The Thai cases suggest that not only do military regimes with legislatures end in democracy more quickly, but with considerably less violence. Having a legislature in place during military rule eases the transition to democracy by ensuring military elites their interests are better represented in the ensuing democracy.

The discussion thus far suggests that legislatures and institutionalized party systems in single party and military regimes should increase the likelihood of democratization, while legislatures in personalist regimes should have little effect on democratization. Hence, the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** Legislatures increase the likelihood of democratization in single party and military regimes.

If the forgoing discuss is correct, we should not only observe that legislatures in military regimes make democracy more likely, but we should observe that protect the corporate interests of the military in a subsequent democracy. The military's corporate interests typically entail securing large budgets; securing autonomy in the military's internal affairs (appointments); and guaranteeing immunity from human rights prosecutions. We should expect, for example, that militaries with legislatures that transitioned to democracy should have larger budget allocations after democratization than military regimes that transitioned without legislatures. So in addition to democratization hypotheses, below I test the "military spending" implication of the argument.

**Hypothesis 3:** Militaries that had legislatures and institutionalized party systems during military rule should receive more military spending after a transition to democracy than militaries that did not have legislatures.

## Resource rents and political payoffs

In the model presented above, an increase in the initial (enticing) distribution provided by the dictator to citizens increases the citizen's payoff for not fighting relative to fighting, thereby reducing the likelihood of democracy. Thus higher initial payments makes democratization less likely - a sentiment consistent with the literature on the oil curse (Ross 2001, Jensen & Wantchekon 2004, Ulfelder 2007). The leverage a legislature can have on democratization - by potentially increasing the credibility of this initial payoff - is conditional on the size of the initial distribution. Simply put, the ability of a legislature to deter democratization by increasing the credibility of this initial payment decreases as the initial payment decreases.

Natural resource rents are a useful measure of the size of this initial distribution. One strain of the natural resource literature debates whether oil rents (for example) cause political instability (Grossman 1999; Karl 1997; Okruhlik 1999) or regime stability (Morrison 2007; Ross 2001; Smith 2004). In both sets of theories, though, oil rents are conceived of as political payoffs: the leader in power distributes the resources to some group in society in exchange for political support. This can either cause resentment and potential instability when the distribution is unequal (the instability thesis) or stability when the leader pays off her/his political coalition that might otherwise destabilize the regime. In both cases, the presence of resource rents increase the political payoffs. Formal models of kleptocracy and personalist divide-and-rule also take as their starting point the existence of abundant resource rents which are then used to payoff political supporters (potential opponents) (Acemoglu & Robinson 2004). In this model, more natural resource rents available for distribution sustain kleptocracy by giving the dictator more resources with which he can buy off opponents off the equilibrium path. No different than the premise of this literature, the contention here is simply that more resource rents implies a larger initial political payoff. If this is true, legislatures should have more leverage to *decrease* the chances of democratization when resource rents are abundant. Lower initial payoffs, however, reduce the leverage of a legislature on the right hand side of the game in Figure 1, thereby increasing the likelihood of democratization.

**Hypothesis 4:** Legislatures should increase the likelihood of democratization when resource rents are low (zero).

## Data and Methods

To test the preceding hypotheses I use an updated version of Geddes' (1999, 2003) data on authoritarian regimes (Wright 2008).<sup>19</sup> I then updated Przeworski et al.'s (2000) data on authoritarian legis-

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<sup>19</sup>The updated coding is included in Appendix. I deal with hybrid regimes in the following manner: military/personal regimes are coded as military; single-party/military, single-party/personalist, and single-party/military/personalist are

latures through 2002.<sup>20</sup> As Table 2 shows, legislatures are nearly ubiquitous in single-party regimes, particularly in the post-Cold War period. In military regimes, legislatures are present in 36% of the regime-years, while in personalist regimes and monarchies, legislatures can be found in 68% and 61% of the regime years, respectively. All types of regime are more likely to have legislatures after the Cold War, perhaps reflecting greater international pressure to stand up democratic-looking institutions in this period.

Table 2: Legislatures in Authoritarian Regimes

Sample	Single Party	Military	Monarchy	Personalist
1946-1989	90%	35%	59%	62%
1990-2002	98%	41%	69%	80%
1946-2002	92%	36%	61%	68%

To model regime survival, I employ a time-series, cross-section (TSCS) multinomial logit model with controls for time dependence. Beck and Katz (1998) point out that the parametric duration models (e.g. Weibull) and the TSCS logit model are the same models, if one properly controls for time dependence in the logit estimation. Following the recommendations of Carter & Signorino (2007), I include polynomial transformations of duration time (*duration*, *duration*<sup>2</sup>, and *duration*<sup>3</sup>) to control for time dependence.

Using a multinomial logit model, Gleiditsch and Choung (2004) show that the determinants of transition from one authoritarian regime to another are quite different from the determinants of a transition to democracy. I pursue the same empirical strategy, modeling the transition to a subsequent authoritarian regime and democratization as separate “failure” outcomes in a multinomial logit model. A country under the rule of a particular authoritarian regime,  $A_{t=0}$ , at  $t = 0$  can have one of three outcomes in the next period,  $t = 1$ : (1) transition to another autocracy,  $A_{2t=1}$ , (2) remain under the rule of  $A_{t=1}$ , or (3) democratize,  $D_{t=1}$ . Previous work on democratization which models transitions between non-democracies and democracies (Przeworski 2000, Boix & Stokes 2003, Epstein & O’Halloran 2006) groups together the first two outcomes, failing to distinguish between authoritarian regime survival ( $A_{t=1}$ ) and transition to a another autocracy ( $A_{2t=1}$ ). Similarly, previous research on the authoritarian regime survival which focuses only on the survival of a particular regime (Geddes 1999, Brownlee 2007), groups together the first and the last outcomes, and does not distinguish between transition to a subsequent autocracy ( $A_{2t=1}$ ) and transition to democracy ( $D_{t=1}$ ). A multinomial logit model estimates the likelihood of transitions to both a subsequent autocracy (coded -1) and a new democracy (coded 1), with regime survival ( $A$ ) as the base category (coded 0). This model can therefore test Hypothesis 1 (likelihood of transition to subsequent

codes as single-party; and monarchies and personalist regimes include no hybrid regimes.

<sup>20</sup>Updates are listed in the Appendix.

authoritarian regime) and Hypotheses 2 and 4 (likelihood of transition to subsequent democracy) simultaneously.

The control variables include: *LogGDPpc*, *Growth*, *Islam*, *Civil Conflict*, *Cold War*, regime types (*Military*, *Single-Party*, and *Monarch*), and region dummies.<sup>21</sup> *Cold War* is an important control because international pressure on authoritarian regimes to appear democratic by holding elections and standing up legislatures increases in the post-Cold War world, as does pressure to democratize. Also, super power states were much more likely to tolerate and subsidize authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. Economic growth in most of the developing world has also been much slower in the post-Cold War period than in the 1960s and 1970s, and the probability of regime failure is higher in the post-Cold War period. Thus, we do not want the legislature variable to simply proxy for a change in the international environment. The level of development (*LogGDPpc*) controls for the fact that richer countries may be more likely to democratize (a version of modernization theory) and may be more likely to have a legislature (see Table 2). We know that some types of regimes are more prone to conflict than others (Weeks 2008) and that conflict may destabilize authoritarian regimes, so I include *Civil Conflict* to ensure that regime types are not simply a proxy for conflict. The authoritarian regime type controls are important because, as Table 8 indicates, different types of regimes have different propensities for creating a legislature, and previous research finds that regime types differ in their propensity to fail (Geddes 1999). For example, military regimes are much less stable than single party regimes, and also less likely to stand up a legislature. Finally, some scholars have suggested that countries with large Muslim populations tend to be less democratic (Lipset 1994, Midlarsky 1998), and this variable has been used as a control in numerous empirical studies on democratization (Ross 2001, Przeworski 2000). Therefore in some models reported below, I control for *Islam*.

Finally, to test Hypotheses 2 and 4, I interact *Legislature* with a dummy variable for *Personalist* regime to differentiate the effect of legislatures in these regimes (Hypothesis 2), and interact legislature with a measure of logged oil and gas rents per capita (*Log Rents*). This resource rents variable measures a countrys total rents from oil and gas (in constant 2000 dollars) divided by its midyear population, and is available from 1960-2002 (Ross 2008).

## Results

The first column of Table 3 reports the base model with no interaction terms. The coefficient for *Legislature* is positive in the democratization panel, but not significant. The model in the second

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<sup>21</sup>*Log(GDPpc)* and *Growth* are from Maddison (2006). *Growth* is the moving average of growth in the previous two years. *Islam* is the share of the population that is Muslim, from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002) with updates from the CIA World Factbook. *Islam* is cross-sectional only and comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002. *Conflict* is from Gleditsch et al (2002) (conflict intensity equal to 3). *Cold War* is coded as one for all years between 1946 and 1990. Personalist is the omitted authoritarian regime type.

Table 3: Transitions to Democracy and Dictatorship

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Transition to Democracy</u>						
Legislature	0.261 (0.32)	0.528* (0.30)	1.106* (0.59)	1.585** (0.63)	1.564* (0.84)	1.126* (0.61)
Personalist*Legislature		-1.305* (0.74)		-1.441* (0.77)	-1.525 (0.94)	
Log rents*Legislature			-0.547*** (0.17)	-0.607*** (0.18)	-0.761*** (0.20)	-0.696*** (0.23)
Personalist	1.254* (0.64)	2.470*** (0.81)	0.922* (0.54)	2.254*** (0.79)	2.258** (0.90)	
Monarchy	0.484 (1.05)	0.499 (1.06)	0.041 (0.87)	0.043 (0.88)	0.268 (1.00)	3.729*** (1.06)
Military	3.688*** (0.64)	3.872*** (0.61)	3.126*** (0.58)	3.304*** (0.54)	4.019*** (0.78)	3.649*** (0.83)
Log rents			0.336** (0.13)	0.383*** (0.14)	0.342** (0.14)	0.431** (0.20)
Parties						2.206*** (0.49)
Log(GDPpc)	0.130 (0.26)	0.116 (0.27)	0.009 (0.26)	-0.013 (0.25)	-0.001 (0.28)	-0.294 (0.21)
Growth	-7.250*** (2.68)	-7.406*** (2.70)	-7.652*** (2.88)	-7.784*** (2.89)	-7.821** (3.44)	-12.292*** (5.22)
Islam	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Civil conflict	-0.059 (0.55)	-0.139 (0.54)	0.358 (0.52)	0.275 (0.50)	0.246 (0.67)	-0.714 (0.89)
Cold war	-2.076*** (0.38)	-2.126*** (0.38)	-2.042*** (0.39)	-2.077*** (0.39)	-2.496*** (0.53)	-1.867*** (0.67)
<u>Transition to Dictatorship</u>						
Legislature	-2.503*** (0.39)	-2.481*** (0.55)	-2.637*** (0.45)	-2.755*** (0.63)	-3.118*** (0.87)	-3.029*** (0.65)
Personalist*Legislature		-0.059 (0.69)		0.240 (0.70)	0.366 (0.92)	
Log rents*Legislature			0.045 (0.17)	0.057 (0.18)	-0.038 (0.38)	0.081 (0.26)
Personalist	0.323 (0.36)	0.352 (0.50)	0.222 (0.37)	0.131 (0.50)	0.133 (0.67)	
Monarchy	-0.285 (0.98)	-0.276 (1.01)	-0.404 (1.11)	-0.433 (1.13)	-0.223 (1.30)	-0.041 (1.80)
Military	0.164 (0.41)	0.172 (0.46)	0.128 (0.43)	0.065 (0.47)	0.889 (0.74)	-0.003 (0.50)
Log rents			-0.069 (0.09)	-0.070 (0.09)	-0.012 (0.09)	-0.151 (0.12)
Parties						0.484** (0.21)
Log(GDPpc)	-0.525** (0.24)	-0.529** (0.25)	-0.462* (0.25)	-0.456* (0.25)	-1.532*** (0.37)	-0.372 (0.26)
Growth	-1.363 (2.34)	-1.355 (2.35)	-1.213 (2.40)	-1.181 (2.37)	-1.512 (2.64)	-0.136 (2.63)
Islam	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Civil conflict	0.645** (0.32)	0.641** (0.32)	0.664** (0.33)	0.679** (0.33)	0.686* (0.39)	-0.187 (0.50)
Cold war	0.223 (0.38)	0.225 (0.38)	0.197 (0.39)	0.198 (0.39)	0.718 (0.46)	-0.298 (0.45)
Log likelihood	-551.154	-550.173	-505.941	-504.786	-367.077	-271.311
Observations	3214	3214	2957	2957	2308	2120
Years	1950-2002	1950-2002	1960-2002	1960-2002	1960-2002	1960-2002
Countries	108	108	108	104	88	91
Hybrids included	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Personalist included	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no

Multinomial logit with time polynomials to control for time dependence (not reported). Standard errors are clustered on regime. Region dummies included in all models, but not reported. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < .10$

column includes the interaction between *Legislature* and *Personalist*, and the coefficient for *Legislature* is positive and significant, suggesting that in non-personalist regimes, legislatures increase the likelihood of democratization. In the third column, the interaction between *Legislature* and *Log Rents* is added, and the coefficient for *Legislature* is again positive and significant. It is important to note that 53% of the sample has no resource rents, so this positive coefficient for *Legislature* estimates its effect on democratization in a little over half the sample. After adding both interaction terms in the fourth column, the coefficient for *Legislature* is much larger and highly significant, again indicating that the legislatures increase the likelihood of democratization in non-personalist regimes with no resource rents. Over one-third (34%) of the full sample has no resource rents and is not a personalist regime. The results for *Legislature* hold up in the when hybrid regimes are excluded (column 5) when a control for the number of parties (0, 1, or more) is added (column 6).<sup>22</sup> The results do not change when any of the control variables are excluded, with one exception: dropping the *Cold War* increases the *Legislature* coefficient in all five models. Further, the main result reported in column 3 remains in both Cold War and post-Cold War samples – though again, it is much stronger in the post-Cold War sample.

Turning to the bottom panel, the results indicate that legislatures decrease the likelihood of transition to a subsequent dictatorship, a finding consistent with the first hypothesis. This result is consistent across specifications and is not conditional on personalist regime or natural resource rents. Together, the evidence from both panels suggests that while dictators in all regimes may institutionalize legislatures and party systems to prevent rival dictators from overthrowing the regime, these institutions also increase the likelihood of democratization in regimes that are not dependent on natural resource rents and regimes where legislatures can help guarantee at least some of the elites' interests after a transition to democracy.

## Modeling Selection

Earlier research on authoritarian legislatures (Wright 2008), points out that legislatures are not randomly distributed amongst authoritarian regimes. While we can control for the observable determinants of legislatures, there may still be unobserved heterogeneity among dictators. Vreeland (2003) and Gandhi (forthcoming) argue, for example, that the unobservable motivations of different dictators bias our estimates of the effect of institutions on outcomes of interest such as economic growth and authoritarian regime survival. An “enlightened” leader might both choose to create a legislature and be less interested in maximizing his tenure in power at all costs than an “unenlightened” leader Gandhi (forthcoming); similarly, some leaders might have more “political will” to both prioritize regime stability and create or maintain a legislature.

One way of dealing with this potential selection effect is to estimate a two-stage Heckman model. The first stage estimates the probability of having a legislature using a probit model. The

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<sup>22</sup>The results remain robust to the exclusion of monarchies from the analysis.

second stage estimates the outcome model and includes the selection parameter ( $\lambda \equiv$  inverse Mill's ratio) from the first stage. For each first-stage outcome of interest ( $j \in (nolegislature, legislature)$ ) I estimate the second-stage equation with  $\lambda$  for each failure outcome ( $m \in (A2, D)$ ):

$$P(Y_j = m) = \frac{\exp(\beta_{jm}\mathbf{X}_j + \theta_{jm}\lambda_{jm})}{\sum_{m=0}^k \exp(\beta_{jm}\mathbf{X}_j + \theta_{jm}\lambda_{jm})} \quad (3)$$

This gives us unbiased estimates for  $\beta_{jm}$  for each first-stage outcome of interest ( $j \in (nolegislature, legislature)$ ) for each second-stage failure outcome ( $m \in (-1, 0, 1) \equiv m \in (A2, D)$ ). We can then calculate the predicted value of the probability of each failure outcome ( $P(\hat{Y}_j = m)$ ) using all the observations, under each condition  $j$  and  $m$ , where  $\hat{\beta}_{jm}$  are the estimated coefficient values from (1):

$$P(\hat{Y}_j = m) = \hat{\beta}_{jm}\mathbf{X} \quad (4)$$

Calculating (2) for each first-stage outcome ( $j \in (nolegislature, legislature)$ ) leaves us with the average values for the predicted probability of each failure outcome under each set of legislative conditions ( $\hat{Y}_{j=0}$  and  $\hat{Y}_{j=1}$ ). The mean values of these predicted probabilities of failure for each failure outcome,  $m \in (A2, D)$ , under each condition,  $j \in (nolegislature, legislature)$ , are reported in Table 4.

Table 4 reports the selection-corrected estimates of the probability of transition, with and without a legislature.<sup>23</sup> The first column looks at the full sample, and consistent with the previous analysis, legislatures have no statistically significant effect on the probability of transition to democracy. In the next three columns, which look at the theoretically relevant samples, the difference is positive and statistically significant. Excluding personalist regimes, a legislature increases the probability of democratization from 1.5% to 2.3% - an increase of over 50% in the transition probability. In the sample with no rents, legislatures double the probability of democratization, increasing it from 1.1% to 2.2%. In the last column, which looks only at non-personalist regimes without abundant natural resource rents, legislatures increase the probability of democratization from nearly 0.5% to over 2.5%. In the lower panel, the selection-corrected estimates for the probability of transition to a subsequent authoritarian regime indicate that legislatures substantially decrease the likelihood of transition in all the samples. These results are robust to the inclusion of the *Parties* variable in the outcome equation, and to the exclusion of hybrid regimes.<sup>24</sup> In sum, the selection-corrected estimates confirm the earlier findings that legislatures increase the chances of democratization in non-personalist regimes and in dictatorship with few resource rents, but dramatically decrease the chances falling to a rival dictator in all types of regimes.

<sup>23</sup>The full selection model is reported in the Appendix.

<sup>24</sup>Further, these results remain when *NeighborDemocracy* is included in the outcome equation. See the Appendix.

Table 4: Selection Corrected Estimates  
of the Probability of Regime Failure

Sample	All regimes	No personalist	No rents	No rents No personalist
Observations	3363	2487	1812	1224
Prob(Democracy) with Legislature	0.022 (0.001)	0.023 (0.001)	0.022 (0.001)	0.025 (0.002)
Prob(Democracy) No Legislature	.0021 (0.001)	0.015 (0.002)	0.011 (0.001)	0.005 (0.000)
Difference	0.001 (0.001)	0.008** (0.002)	0.011** (0.001)	0.020** (0.002)
Prob(Dictatorship) with Legislature	0.010 (0.000)	0.009 (0.000)	0.012 (0.000)	0.011 (0.001)
Prob(Dictatorship) No Legislature	0.115 (0.002)	0.116 (0.002)	0.143 (0.002)	0.145 (0.004)
Difference	-0.105** (0.002)	-0.106** (0.003)	-0.131** (0.003)	-0.134** (0.003)

Mean predicted probability of event reported in each cell. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\* $p < .0001$

## Legislatures and military spending after democratic transition

The third hypothesis suggests that militaries with legislatures that transitioned to democracy should have larger budget allocations after democratization than military regimes that transitioned without legislatures. In Table 5, I test a multivariate model to see whether the presence of a legislature during military rule affects changes in military spending after a transition to democracy. I present the results of a feasible generalized least squares regression (FGLS), controlling for conflict, the Cold War, and the number of years from the transition to democracy.<sup>25</sup> Post-military regime democracies fighting civil wars, such as in Guatemala and Peru in the 1980s, might have larger increases in the military budget, so I include an ordinal variable (1-3) that measures the level of conflict, from Gleditsch et al. (2002).<sup>26</sup> Cold War democracies might also be less reluctant to cut their military budgets because of a perceived communist threat, so I include a *Cold War* dummy. Also, as a democracy moves further away from military rule, the civilian government may be more likely to cut military spending. Therefore I include a variable measuring how many years from the transition have lapsed (*Years since transition*).

In all three models, the coefficient for legislature is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that having a legislature prior to the transition to democracy boosts the annual increase in post-transition military spending by between 2% and 3%. These results are consistent with the conjecture that legislatures increase the likelihood of democratization in military regimes because regime elites use the legislature to guarantee their corporate interests during the transition to democracy.

Admittedly, the military budget is not the only measure of military influence in a post-authoritarian period (Pion-Berlin 2001). But military spending is the only measure that is easily comparable across time and across countries. That military regimes with legislatures fare better than military regimes without legislatures in a subsequent democracy is consistent with the credible guarantee story. This is a relative story, though. Military regimes are the most likely of all regimes to democratize because military elites often care more about their corporate interests than about ruling. Legislatures and party systems can make military elites more amenable to democratization if they can use these institutions to protect their core interests after a transition. This argument is not that a legislature will guarantee the military all that it wants, only that with a legislature, the military will get more of what it wants.

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<sup>25</sup>Data on military spending are from Stockholm International for Peace Research Institute Yearbooks from various years. I exclude country-years from countries that experienced a democratic failure, reverting to authoritarianism, in the first five years after the initial transition to democracy. I estimate an iterated FGLS model that allows for panel heteroskedasticity in the error structure. Likelihood ratio tests confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity. I also test for autocorrelation in the panel data using a test developed by Woolridge 2002 (pp. 282-283) which indicates there is no autocorrelation in the data. I also conducted a simple means test, which is not reported to space limitations, which show robust results similar to those in Table 4.

<sup>26</sup>This variable delineates three levels of conflict intensity: minor conflict (< 25 deaths/year), intermediate conflict (< 1000 deaths/year), and war (> 1000 deaths/year).

Table 5: Changes in Military Expenditure  
(First Five Years After Military  
Transition to Democracy)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)
Authoritarian legislature	2.292*	2.845*	2.869*
	(1.15)	(1.18)	(1.27)
Conflict		3.418*	3.717**
		(1.36)	(1.35)
Cold War			-0.246
			(1.22)
Years since transition			0.700
			(0.39)
Constant	-4.809**	-5.378**	-7.375**
	(0.96)	(1.00)	(2.00)
Log Likelihood	-484.5	-482.6	-480.9
Observations	127	127	127

Iterated FGLS estimator with panel heteroskedastic errors. Dependent variable is the change in military spending from the previous year. Sample includes: Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Central African Republic (1993), Chile (1989), Ecuador (1979), Guatemala (1985), Lesotho (1993), Niger (1993), Niger (1999), Nigeria (1999), Pakistan (1988), Panama (1989), Peru (1980), South Korea (1987), Thailand (1988), Thailand (1992), and Uruguay (1985). Standard errors in parentheses. \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ .

## Conclusion

The results in this paper provide further evidence for the growing consensus that authoritarian institutions matter (Brownlee 2007, Boix 2003, Gandhi forthcoming, Gandhi & Przeworski 2007, Gandhi & Przeworski 2006, Geddes 2005, Geddes 1999, Smith 2005, Wright 2008). The finding that legislative institutions in dictatorships systematically reduce the likelihood of being replaced by a subsequent authoritarian regime concurs with recent research showing that institutionalization, if done properly, can aid the survival of dictators. The contribution of the present study, hopefully, is to help us understand how legislative institutions might affect the prospects for democratization. In doing so, this paper first separates the mechanisms through which legislatures reduce the chances of being replaced by a subsequent dictator from the channels through which legislatures can influence the prospects of democratization. Reflecting this distinction, the empirical tests then estimate the effect of legislatures on the likelihood of two types of authoritarian failure: transition to democracy and transition to a subsequent dictatorship.

The finding that legislative institutions can increase the likelihood of democratization in some types of regimes, I argue, reflects the fact that legislative institutions, even when devised to quell threats from authoritarian rivals, can be strong enough to exert influence over the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy. This point echoes the reasoning Dahl (1971) suggests for why economic equality should make democracy more likely: higher equality means that the median voter in a democracy will be less likely to prefer redistribution from the rich to the poor, making the rich more amenable to democratization. The basic insight, which I argue is applicable to legislatures in some types of authoritarian regimes, is that when the elite are less threatened by democratization, they are more likely to adopt it. Some of the most influential theories of comparative democratization in recent years make this intuition central to their explanation of democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, 2006, Boix 2003, Robinson 2006). These theories argue that structural conditions, such as inequality or asset mobility, limit the ability of the enfranchised poor to tax the rich in a democracy. The present paper expands on this notion by suggesting that institutional legacies can play a similar role of protecting elite interests in a subsequent democracy. The central interest of authoritarian elites may not simply be to protect themselves from taxation under democracy, particularly for military elites who may be more concerned about military budgets and avoiding prosecution for human rights violations. Political institutions are thus relevant when considering the wide range of interests outgoing authoritarian elites may have. This reasoning, of course, invites a more careful analysis of the types of authoritarian political institutions that can exert influence over the distribution of power in a new democracy. While this paper has focused on legislatures and party systems, judicial institutions merit systematic examination as well (Moustafa 2007).

By distinguishing legislative institutions in personalist regimes from those in other types of regimes, this research also contributes to the small, but growing literature which utilizes variation amongst different types of authoritarian regimes to help us understand phenomena as distinct as

economic growth (Wright 2008) and international conflict (Peceny & Beer 2002, Reiter & Stam 2004, Weeks 2008). While students of comparative politics were the first to note (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, Jackson & Rosberg 1982, Wintrobe 1998) and systematically disaggregate (Geddes 1999) personalistic rule from other types of authoritarian polities, it has mostly been international relations scholars who have thought through how variation amongst different types of regimes might affect their theories. For example, Weeks (2008) argues that personalist rule is unable to generate sufficient audience costs to demonstrate the resolve necessary to avoid conflict during militarized disputes. Further, Reiter & Stam (2004) show that personalist rulers are more likely to initiate wars with democracies because they face fewer institutional constraints at home. While the present paper argues that legislatures and party systems in personalist regimes are typically not strong enough to influence the distribution of power after a democratic transition, there is no reason that other important questions in comparative political economy might not be fruitfully explored by distinguishing personalist rule from other types of authoritarianism. For example, the literature on the human capital (e.g. health or education) benefits of democratization (Baum & Lake 2003; Brown & Hunter 1999, 2004; Ross 2006), the trade consequences of democratization (Milner & Kubota 2006; Kono 2006), or the political resource curse literature (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007) might all benefit from thinking more carefully about variation amongst different types of authoritarianism.

The main argument of this paper suggests that institutional legacies are more likely to matter when institutions are strong. Party systems and legislatures that help build mass political support in single party regimes also give party leaders reason to believe they can win multi-party elections. And close ties with authoritarian parties and legislatures in military regimes give military elites confidence that their interests will not be tread upon too harshly in a subsequent democracy. Authoritarian elites in these regimes thus do not have to fight to the death. Strong authoritarian institutions give them a face-saving exit, preserving some of their power, which in turn makes them more likely to exit. Weak authoritarian institutions, on the other hand, help personalist dictators keep would-be rivals in check, but do not increase the likelihood of democratization. Because legislatures in personalist regimes do not constrain the state, they are of little use in preserving the power of authoritarian elites in a post-authoritarian game.

## Appendix

Table 6 reports updates to Geddes (1999, 2003) data on authoritarian regime types. The original data were developed to test the probability of regime failure for different types of authoritarian regimes (military, single party, personalist, and hybrid versions of these three prototypes).<sup>27</sup> The original data spanned from 1950 to 2000, but did not include monarchies and only included data on regimes that endured more than three years. Thus, many of the least durable regimes, and a handful of long-lasting monarchies were excluded. I updated the data to include monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Kuwait, but also Iran under the Shah, Nepal, Swaziland, and Ethiopia under Haile Salasse. I have also updated all regimes to the year 2002, added regimes (and regime-years) that lasted less than four years, and have included regimes from the old Soviet bloc, such as the Central Asian republics and Belarus.

Table 7 reports updates to the authoritarian legislature variable. I coded an authoritarian legislature as one when representatives in a legislature are allowed to meet, or a constitution was written which allows a legislature and the first meeting of the legislature takes place at a later date. This latter condition only occurs at the beginning of a nation at indecency, but not after a dictator announces new elections for parliament after having previously disbanded the legislature (Kuwait 1992). When presidents disband an existing parliament and immediately reinstate a new one, this does not count as the end of a legislature. When a dictator disbands a legislature and bans parties, but keeps a council this counts as an end to the legislature. If there is a lag between a legislature being disbanded and new elections this period is coded as no legislature. Legislatures may be appointed, but military juntas do not constitute legislatures. Finally, there is no need for a formal party organization to exist, but there must be clear rules about how legislators are selected (e.g. racial, tribal, religious quotas).

Table 8 reports the results from the selection model. The first column reports the first stage equation. The only variable included here that is not discussed earlier is *NeighborDemocracy*, which measures the mean Polity score of all neighboring countries with capitol cities within 2000 km of the target country. Using other distances (1000, 5000 km) does not change the results. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant, and many of the results are consistent with earlier research: natural resource rents decrease and more neighboring democracy increases the likelihood of a legislature (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). The second stage equations, one for each outcome of interest, for samples with and without legislatures, are reported in columns 2-5. Consistent with earlier research (Geddes 1999), military regimes are the most likely to democratize and single party regimes (the excluded category) are less likely to democratize than military or personalist regimes. Finally, recent economic growth makes transition less likely, consistent with the contention that economic crisis breeds regime breakdown and democratization.

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<sup>27</sup>See Geddes 2003 for a discussion of how the authoritarian regime types are coded

Table 6: Authoritarian Regime Coding (Update to Geddes 1999)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Begin</u>	<u>Exit</u>	<u>Regime Type</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Begin</u>	<u>Exit</u>	<u>Regime Type</u>
Algeria	2000	NA	Military-Personalist	Jordan	1946	NA	Monarchy
Azerbaijan	1993	NA	Personalist	Kazakhstan	1991	NA	Personalist
Belarus	1991	1994	Personalist	Kenya	1963	NA	Single Party
Belarus	1994	NA	Personalist	Kyrgyzstan	1991	NA	Personalist
Benin	1961	1963	Personalist	Kuwait	1961	NA	Monarchy
Benin	1963	1964	Personalist	Lesotho	1966	1986	Single Party
Benin	1964	1965	Personalist	Lesotho	1986	1992	Military
Benin	1965	1968	Personalist	Liberia	1997	NA	Personalist
Benin	1968	1969	Personalist	Libya	1952	1969	Monarchy
Benin	1970	1972	Personalist	Mauritania	1978	1984	Military
Benin	1972	1991	Personalist	Mauritania	1984	NA	Military-Personalist
Bolivia	1969	1971	Military-Personalist	Moldova	1991	1996	Single Party-Personalist
Bolivia	1980	1981	Military	Mongolia	1946	1991	Single Party
Burkina Faso	1960	1966	Personalist - Post Colonial	Nepal	1952	1990	Monarchy
Burkina Faso	1980	1982	Military-Personalist	Nepal	2000	NA	Monarchy
Burkina Faso	1982	1983	Military-Personalist	Niger	1996	1999	Military-Personalist
Burundi	1962	1965	Monarchy	Oman	1951	NA	Monarchy
Cambodia	1993	1997	Personalist	Pakistan	1999	NA	Military-Personalist
Central African Republic	1979	1981	Personalist	Peru	1992	2000	Personalist
Dominican Republic	1962	1963	Personalist	Serbia and Montenegro	1992	1997	Personalist
Dominican Republic	1963	1965	Military	Saudi Arabia	1932	NA	Monarchy
Dominican Republic	1965	1966	Military	Swaziland	1968	NA	Monarchy
Ecuador	1966	1967	Personalist	Syria	1961	1963	Military
Ecuador	1968	1972	Personalist	Tajikistan	1992	NA	Personalist
Eritrea	1993	NA	Personalist	Thailand	1991	1992	Military
Ethopia	1960	1974	Monarchy	Togo	1961	1963	Personalist
Gambia	1994	NA	Military-Personalist	Turkey	1960	1961	Military
Georgia	1992	NA	Personalist	Turkmenistan	1991	NA	Personalist
Haiti	1986	1990	Military	United Arab Emirates	1971	NA	Monarchy
Haiti	1991	1994	Military	Uganda	1985	1986	Military
Iran	1953	1979	Monarchy	Uzbekistan	1991	NA	Personalist

NA≡Right Censored in 2002. Countries where no one group could claim control over the majority of the territory were coded as being at disintegrating/“at war” and are not included as authoritarian regimes (e.g. Congo Kinshasa (1961-1965), Sierra Leone (1990-1996), Serbia and Montenegro (1997-2000)).

Table 7: Authoritarian Legislature Updates

Country	Begin	End	Legislature	Country	Begin	End	Legislature	Country	Begin	End	Legislature	Country	Begin	End	Legislature
Albania	1980	1991	1	Ethiopia	1996	2002	1	Libya	1998	2002	0	Saudi Arabia	1960	2002	0
Algeria	1991	2002	1	Gabon	1991	2002	1	Madagascar	1961	1966	1	Senegal	1960		1
Angola	1990	2002	1	Gambia	1991	2002	1	Madagascar	1987	1993	1	Senegal	1992	2000	1
Argentina	1952	1955	0	Georgia	1993	2002	1	Malawi	1991	1994	1	Sierra Leone	1991	1992	1
Argentina	1957	1958	1	Ghana	1991		0	Malaysia	1991	2002	1	Sierra Leone	1993	1996	0
Armenia	1996	1998	1	Ghana	1992	2000	1	Mali	1991		1	Singapore	1991	2002	1
Azerbaijan	1993	2002	1	Greece	1970		0	Mauritania	1991	1992	0	South Africa	1953	1994	1
Belarus	1993	2002	1	Greece	1971	1974	1	Mauritania	1993	2002	1	Soviet Union	1962		1
Benin	1991		1	Guatemala	1957		1	Mexico	1952	1959	1	Soviet Union	1989		1
Bolivia	1955	1959	1	Guatemala	1958		0	Mexico	1991	2000	1	Spain	1952	1979	0
Botswana	1990	2002	1	Guinea	1991	1994	0	Moldova	1993	1996	1	Sudan	1960	1964	0
Bulgaria	1980		1	Guinea	1995	2002	1	Mongolia	1981	1984	1	Sudan	1969	1970	0
Burkina Faso	1991	1992	0	Guinea-Bissau	1974	1999	1	Mongolia	1991		1	Sudan	1991	2002	0
Burkina Faso	1993	2002	1	Haiti	1960		0	Morocco	1956	1959	0	Suriname	1980	1984	0
Burundi	1991	1993	0	Haiti	1990	1994	0	Morocco	1991	2002	1	Suriname	1985	1987	1
Burundi	1995	1997	0	Honduras	1952	1955	1	Mozambique	1991	2002	1	Swaziland	1990	2002	1
Burundi	1998	2002	1	Honduras	1956		0	Nepal	1960		0	Syria	1991	2002	1
Cambodia	1997	2002	1	Hungary	1960	1970	1	Nepal	1987	1990	1	Taiwan	1953	1998	1
Cameroon	1991	2002	1	Indonesia	1952	1960	1	Nepal	2002	2002	1	Tajikistan	1993	2002	1
Cen African Rep	1960		1	Indonesia	1991	1998	1	Nicaragua	1937	1959	1	Tanzania	1989	2002	1
Cen African Rep	1991	1994	1	Iran	1953	1957	0	Niger	1960		1	Thailand	1953	1957	1
Chad	1960		1	Iran	1958	1959	1	Niger	1990	1992	0	Thailand	1991		1
Chad	1991	1996	0	Iran	1991	2002	1	Niger	1993	1996	1	Togo	1991	2002	1
Chad	1997	2002	1	Ivory Coast	1991	1999	1	Nigeria	1991	1999	0	Tunisia	1960		0
China	1953	1960	1	Jordan	1953	1959	1	Oman	1971	2002	0	Tunisia	1991	2002	1
China	1991	2002	1	Jordan	1991	2002	1	Pakistan	1999	2001	1	Turkmenistan	1993	2002	1
Colombia	1956	1958	1	Kazakhstan	1993	2002	1	Pakistan	2002	2002	0	UAE	1973	2002	1
Congo Brazzaville	1991	1992	1	Kenya	1991	2002	1	Paraguay	1952	1954	1	Uganda	1991	1994	0
Congo Brazzaville	1997	1999	1	Kuwait	1963	1984	1	Paraguay	1957	1959	1	Uganda	1995	2002	1
Congo Brazzaville	2000	2002	0	Kuwait	1985	1992	0	Paraguay	1991	1993	1	Uzbekistan	1993	2002	1
Congo Kinshasa	1990	2002	1	Kuwait	1993	2002	1	Peru	1952	1956	1	Venezuela	1952	1958	1
Cuba	1985	1996	1	Laos	1984		1	Peru	1992	2000	1	Vietnam	1984	2002	1
Dominican Rep	1953	1961	1	Laos	1991	2002	1	Poland	1970		1	Yemen	1978		0
Egypt	1953	1959	1	Lesotho	1991	1992	0	Portugal	1952	1974	1	Yemen	1986	2002	1
Egypt	1991	2002	1	Liberia	1987	1990	1	Romania	1960		1	Yugoslavia	1960		1
El Salvador	1951	1959	1	Liberia	1997	2002	1	Rwanda	1991	1992	1	Zambia	1991		1
Ethiopia	1987	1995	0	Libya	1960	1987	0	Rwanda	1993	2002	0	Zimbabwe	1991	2002	1

Coding for non-missing data.

Table 8: Selection model

Stage Dep Var. Sample	First Legislature All	Second Dem. No Leg	Second Dict. No Leg	Second Dem. Leg	Second Dict. Leg
Belgian colony	-0.451*** (0.14)				
British colony	-0.221*** (0.08)				
Ethnic frac.	0.533*** (0.12)				
Neighbor democracy	0.527*** (0.10)				
Log(Rents)	-0.086*** (0.01)	0.428* (0.22)	-0.011 (0.16)	-0.172 (0.11)	0.050 (0.17)
Log(GDPpc)	0.238*** (0.05)	1.029 (0.80)	-0.680*** (0.21)	-0.182 (0.27)	-0.363 (0.23)
Military	-1.926*** (0.08)	27.407*** (6.38)	1.133 (1.48)	3.210** (1.55)	1.560 (2.11)
Monarch	-0.860*** (0.10)	-16.116* (8.92)	-1.060** (0.44)	0.447 (1.13)	1.161 (0.79)
Personal	-0.950*** (0.07)	23.744*** (3.73)	0.125 (0.17)	0.911 (0.64)	0.709 (1.11)
Islam	-0.003*** (0.00)	0.006 (0.02)	0.006 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Cold war	-0.517*** (0.08)	2.036 (1.54)	0.811 (0.66)	-2.713*** (0.56)	0.204 (0.87)
Growth		-14.495* (8.81)	-0.212 (2.25)	-6.159** (3.05)	-2.892 (5.36)
Lambda		-18.080 (15.28)	-5.322 (5.59)	0.523 (5.63)	-1.046 (6.73)
Log likelihood	-1302.815	-55.866	-177.770	-151.617	-96.830
Observations	2957	806	806	2143	2143

Dependent variable is Legislature. Duration polynomials included in all models, not reported. Region dummies in models 2-5, not reported. Standard errors are clustered on regime. \*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .10$ .

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