

Thesis: our folk value theory recognizes robustly demanding values

Plan: to illustrate the idea by freedom of choice; to introduce status freedoms as examples; to show how attachments and virtues support similar status goods.

Freedom of choice

Does freedom in an X-Y choice require just non-frustration (of preference), a la Hobbes? Berlin's argument suggests not. The open-doors view is the alternative he offers.

Note 1. Better to be non-frustrated in access to the preferred X than the unpreferred Y.

2. You may be said to freely choose X, if you do not know that Y is blocked.

This means that freedom in a choice requires non-frustration, no matter what you prefer. It is a robustly demanding good, requiring non-frustration in actual and possible worlds. Which worlds? The actual X-world and the Y-world. And some 'realizer' variants on each.

We might take freedom to be even more demanding, as in republican theory.

A Berlinian argument against Berlin. The open-doors-no-doorkeepers view.

Freedom in a choice requires non-frustration in a range of X and Y worlds

that includes X and Y worlds where others are hostile to your choosing as you wish.

You choose as you wish regardless both of how you wish to choose and

of how others wish, on an unconstrained basis, that you should choose.

Note that there may be some indeterminacy about the range of relevant worlds.

The difference between the two comes out in their connection with the notion of power.

I have power over you insofar as I influence you, regardless of my or your wishes.

I have power over me insofar as I avoid frustration, regardless of my or your wishes.

This is republican freedom of choice; Berlinian allows me to depend on your wishes.

Agent	Domain	Source	Thin good	Rich good
<i>You respond to</i>	<i>over changes in</i>	<i>as a result of</i>	<i>robustly providing</i>	<i>actually providing</i>
my will for you	my or your will for you	a constraining factor	influence	power over you
my will for me	my or your will for me	a constraining factor	non-frustration	republican freedom
my will for me	my will for me	any factor, even goodwill	non-frustration	Berlinian freedom

Status freedoms

Consider freedom of ownership: the freedom to keep or gift or trade or destroy...

Would Berlinian freedom over these options suffice for ownership? Surely not.

Would republican freedom? Not if you just rely on strength to hold on to what you have.

What is needed, intuitively, is a public infrastructure that restricts others.

This might be provided by coercive laws that implement titles and rights of ownership.

And/or by norms of ownership that regulate on the basis of sanctions of esteem.

Df. 1 there is a suitable, general regularity of conformity;

2 everyone expects others to approve of anyone's conforming;

3 this expectation helps to explain the conformity. Plus common awareness?

This norm can also be a reliable source of non-frustration, especially if it is *internalized*.

Internalization requires everyone to approve as well as being expected to approve. Coercive laws will operate best on the basis of internalized norms. Rousseau. Tyler. Freedom of ownership gives us an objective and subjective status against others. It means that we enjoy robust non-frustration on a public, manifest basis. And it means that, given the laws or norms, we can make claims against others. Why is such a status required? Ownership is seen as a desirable liberty, co-enjoyable by all. Unsurprisingly, then, the same lesson holds for other designedly co-enjoyable liberties. These are the basic liberties we expect societies to define in law for their members.

Agent	Domain	Source	Thin good	Rich good
<i>You respond to</i>	<i>over changes in</i>	<i>as a result of</i>	<i>robustly providing</i>	<i>actually providing</i>
my will in owning	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of ownership
my will in speech	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of speech
my will in practice	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of religion
my will in association	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of association
my will between jobs	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of occupation
my will in location	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	F of location
my will in all such	my will, your will(s)	law and norm	non-frustration	Respect

Attachments

I think of attachments as bonds with other people that make them apt to be favored. A bond selects certain people, in their individuality, as worthy of favor. It does not constitute the normative reason why a person favors those individuals. You do not favor me just because I am your lover or friend, for example. In that case I would benefit by happening to fall under your favor-friends strategy. I would not command your favor in my individuality, only incidentally. I ought to attract your favor because, as you think, it's PP or it's your friend, PP. We will see a contrast in this respect with virtues. Attachments are not special virtues.

Consider now the case of love or friendship as an exemplar of a variety of attachments. You give me care in loving me: i.e. affection, concern, attention, etc. But under accepted standards you must give it fairly robustly. Shakespeare. Wilde. And this, even where I am not congenial and/or it is inconvenient for you to care. The standards link love/friendship constitutively with care under many such variations. They allow it, and applaud it, under variations where care would require heroism. They allow it, but don't applaud, under variations where I am criminal, immoral, sadistic... And especially where care would require you to be criminal, immoral, servile...

The standards associated with love and friendship usually have the form of local norms. They do not just define the rules of attachment but prescribe conformity to them. They are policed, as a matter of common awareness, by sanctions of (expected) approval. And they thereby provide beneficiaries with subjective & objective status. Beneficiaries can make claims under relevant norms as friends and lovers and so on. Thus all these robustly demanding goods count as status goods like status freedoms.

Are esteem sanctions in danger of ‘crowding out’ spontaneous motives of attachment?
 They would do so if, like money, they supported a rival target of concern.
 But they need not do so, at least if the norms are internalized in the community.
 In that case people will act on the basis of their own approval, supported by others.
 They will be reinforced in the dispositions associated with attachments.

What holds of love and friendship can hold of a range of other attachments too.

Agent	Domain	Source	Thin good	Rich good
<i>You respond to</i>	<i>over changes in</i>	<i>as a result of</i>	<i>robustly providing</i>	<i>actually providing</i>
my need	congeniality & convenience	attachment	caring treatment	love
my need	congeniality & convenience	attachment	friendly treatment	friendship
my need	congeniality & convenience	attachment	neighborly support	neighborliness
my need	congeniality & convenience	attachment	collegial support	collegiality
my need	congeniality & convenience	attachment	comradely support	solidarity

Virtues

Virtues are to be restricted here to other-regarding virtues, not usually enforced by law.
 Attachments select people for favorable treatment, making their identity crucial.
 Virtues identify grounds for favoring whoever happen to occupy relevant positions.
 To be kind is to be disposed to be moved by the kindness of certain acts.
 To be fair is to be disposed to be moved by fairness. And so on generally.
 But note that the virtue terms may not always indicate the relevant grounds.
 You can be kind while just tracking and responding to the needs of others.
 You can be fair while just tracking and responding to differences of fortune.
 And to be generous is certainly not to be responsive to the generosity of acts.
 Rather it is to be relatively indifferent to personal cost in helping others.
 I assume only: to have any virtue is to track and respond to *certain* considerations.

Consider honesty now as an example of a virtue.

If you are honest you will be disposed to tell the truth, as you see it.

But under accepted standards actual truth-telling is not sufficient to count as honest.

They require you to tell the truth even if it does not suit your interests to do so.

(But perhaps not if it does not suit my interests to hear the truth. Honesty \neq candor.)

They require you to tell the truth under variations where relevant considerations apply.

The standards link honesty constitutively with truth-telling under many variations.

They allow it, with applause, in cases where it would be heroic to tell the truth.

They allow it, without applause, in cases where the considerations are outweighed.

Example: the case where the would-be murderer asks after where their quarry is.

Suppose sensitivity to conflicting reasons is associated with having other virtues.

It will follow that the virtues work well only in a package. The unity of the virtues?

In the would-be murderer case honesty allows truth-telling but virtue forbids it.

The standards defining honesty will usually have the form of local norms, as with love. They will not just define the rules of virtue but prescribe conformity to them. Relying on sanctions of (expected) approval, people can enjoy a corresponding status. They can make claims under relevant norms as persons to whom honesty is due. Thus honesty, and any virtue like it, can also count as a status good. And as in the other case esteem sanctions need not 'crowd out' virtuous motives. What holds with honesty, holds with many similar virtues.

Agent	Domain	Source	Thin good	Rich good
<i>You respond to</i>	<i>over changes in</i>	<i>as a result of</i>	<i>robustly providing</i>	<i>actually providing</i>
my need to know	your interest	virtue	non-deception	honesty
my vulnerability	my belief, your disbelief	virtue	non-oppression	tolerance
my weakness	your interest	virtue	non-violence	peacefulness
my explicit reliance	your interest	virtue	promise-keeping	fidelity
my tacit reliance	your interest	virtue	reliance-satisfaction	trustworthiness
my deserts	my deserts, your convenience	virtue	desert-satisfaction	fairness
my plight	your fears	virtue	assistance	courage

A problem for virtues (and attachments)?

Psychological evidence from the Milgram and Darley experiments. (Harman)
 This appears to show that people's character traits have little explanatory value. It supports situationism according to which there are only high-level, common traits. There are no individually variable, temporally stable, traits like virtues. But virtues are not meant to be low-level traits that operate similarly across situations. They are habits of reason-tracking that interact and often check one another. Consistently with such habits explaining behavior, there could be lots of variation. (Sosa)
 This, in how different people behave & in how the same person behaves at different times.

Still, the evidence does suggest that virtues may not be as robust as often assumed. The robustness of a virtue means that internally it has a low degree of conditionality. V consists in the disposition to provide a thin benefit either if w, or x, or y, or z.... But a low degree of internal conditionality allows high external conditionality. It might be that V would fail to operate properly if a or b or c....were the case. All that is ruled out is that a, b and c should not overlap with w, x, y, z...

It might be plausible to think that people are only virtuous in normal social contexts. We might even think of such social contexts as providing a grounding infrastructure. People might cease to be virtuous, for example, if wearing the ring of Gyges. More generally, their virtue might depend on the role of esteem and effective norms. This dependence would show that people are corruptible, not actually corrupt. Their virtue might have a local character; it might supervene partly on local context.