- Preface
- CHAPTER 1: PROBABILITY
- 1.1 Bets and Probabilities
- 1.2 Why Probabilities are Additive
- 1.3 Laws of Probability
- 1.4 Conditional Probability
- 1.5 Laws of Conditional Probability
- 1.6 Why `|' Can't be a Connective
- 1.7 Changing your Mind; Conditioning
- 1.8 Generalized Conditioning
- 1.9 Bayes' Theorem
- 1.10 Independence
- 1.11 "Real Probability"; Chance
- 1.12 Problems
- 1.13 Notes
- SOLUTIONS
- CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
- 2.1 Confirmation
- 2.2 Huygens on Light
- 2.3 Observation and Sufficiency
- 2.4 Leverrier on Neptune
- 2.5 Multiple Uncertainties
- 2.6 Dorling on the Duhem problem
- 2.7 Einstein vs. Newton, 1919
- 2.8 Bell's Inequalities: Holt vs. Clauser
- 2.9 Laplace vs. Adams
- 2.10 Dorling's conclusions
- 2.11 Problems
- 2.12 Notes
- CHAPTER 3: EXPECTATION
- 3.1 Desirability
- 3.2 Problems
- 3.3 Rescaling
- 3.4 Expectations, RV's, Indicators
- 3.5 Why Expectations are Additive
- 3.6 Conditional Expectation
- 3.7 Laws of Expectation
- 3.8 Physical Analogies; Mean and Median
- 3.9 Desirabilies as Expectations
- 3.10 Notes
- SOLUTIONS
- CHAPTER 4: DECISION
- 4.1 Preference Logic
- 4.2 Kinematics
- 4.3 Causality
- 4.4 Fisher
- 4.5 Newcomb
- 4.6 Hofstadter
- 4.7 Conclusion
- 4.8 Notes
- 4.9 References
- CHAPTER 5: PROBABILISM AND INDUCTION
- 5.1 Probabilism, what
- 5.2 Induction, what
- 5.3 Justifying induction
- 5.4 Solution or evasion?
- 5.5 Notes
Please write to bayesway@princeton.edu with any comments or suggestions.
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PROBABILISTIC THINKING
© 1995 by Richard Jeffrey
Princeton University
Princeton University
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