

# MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

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INMM Annual Meeting | July 2017

Revision 3



# NU

[www.verification.nu](http://www.verification.nu)

# OVERVIEW

1. Tools and Utilities
2. Tour of Nu
3. Map Applications
- (4. Virtual Reality Exercise)

# NU MAPPING UTILITIES

## CONSTRUCTING COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION APPROACHES



### 1. TECHNOLOGY ORIENTATION AND LOCALIZATION

View the broader context of a verification technology and possible overlap with existing treaties



### 2. IDENTIFYING AND CLOSING GAPS

View the map in terms of verified and unverified transfer pathways


*for example, between facilities within a given sector, between sectors, or to the “hinterland”*



### 3. CONTEXT FOR VIRTUAL REALITY INSPECTIONS

Within a given Nu strategy, utilize VR for more detailed facility level inspection design & simulation

# MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION



**NU**

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# WEBSITE TOUR

[www.verification.nu](http://www.verification.nu)

# Mapping Nuclear Verification

Public Beta

Laying the Basis for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

THE PROJECT

NU MAP

TECHNOLOGIES

GET IN TOUCH



# Discover the Nuclear Verification Landscape





# Explore Nuclear Verification Technologies

Verification technology development is an area rich in innovation and centers on answering questions such as: How can we determine whether a country is telling the truth about the total size of its nuclear arsenal? How can we determine whether a nuclear weapon presented to us is real, without learning any classified information about it? And, how can we ensure that a country is not secretly assembling new weapons under a treaty? We have made strides toward answers, but more work is needed.

[VIEW ALL TECHNOLOGIES](#)





# Identification



## EDDY CURRENT METHODS

Verification methods involving eddy currents have the potential to support the goal of achieving just enough information to uniquely identify items without providing unnecessary information.



## MODAL TESTING

Modal vibration signatures might be used to uniquely identify warheads and containers.

ACCOUNTING


CONFIRMATION

CONTINUITY-OF-KNOWLEDGE

IDENTIFICATION

REMOTE AND PERIMETER MONITORING

# Remote and Perimeter Monitoring



# Magtag





*MAGTAG blankets containing randomly oriented magnets are used to cover storage containers. A highly sensitive magnetometer detects any changes in the magnetic field due to illicit movements.*

## OVERVIEW

In the late 1990s, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed and demonstrated a number of systems that provided continuous, live sensor data to inspectors outside the facility in order to eliminate the need for information barriers and encryption.

The Magazine Transparency System (MTS) is one of these systems. It is designed to monitor treaty-limited items during either short-term long-term storage and detects unauthorized movement of weapon containers from the facility. Only passive tags and






Fast neutron multiplicity counter



Buddy Tag (joint with Sandia)





Nuclear resonance fluorescence




Neutron Coincidence Anisotropy Setup

Next-generation Infrasound Sensors



# MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION CHALLENGES

Ensuring the peaceful application of fissile material production




Verifying numerical limits on declared nuclear warheads



# NU

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
Establishing confidence in the absence of undeclared stocks or production



Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads




# VERIFYING NUMERICAL LIMITS ON DECLARED NUCLEAR WARHEADS



# CONFIRMING NUCLEAR WARHEADS



# EXAMPLE | WARHEAD LIMIT AGREEMENT



## 1. HASHED DECLARATIONS

Privacy-preserving declarations based on cryptographic hash functions, which would only reveal certain information for a particular site (if an inspection is called for that site)



## 2. PORTAL MONITOR


Portal-perimeter system to detect the passage of nuclear materials, for example, using standard neutron detectors



# EXAMPLE | WARHEAD LIMIT AGREEMENT

## Hashed Declarations

Confirming declared number of warheads



# NU


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Portal System  
Facility-level  
perimeter  
monitoring



Inspector Escort  
Material sent to  
conversion or  
disposition facility

# EXAMPLE | WARHEAD LIMIT AGREEMENT



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# MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

## EXERCISES IN VIRTUAL REALITY





# NU

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A

B



C



*Display area with a tabletop model of the site;  
In the background, shelves  
with buddy tags, one of them disturbed*



*Storage bunker with warhead storage containers;  
Inspectors can select one or more  
containers for inspection with information barrier*



*Closeup of detector and information barrier with simulated radiation spectrum and shielding material handled by user*

# STUDENT INSPECTIONS IN VIRTUAL REALITY

## APRIL 2017



Virtual reality inspections of a warhead storage site | April 2017 | WWS 353 Science and Global Security

# FUTURE WORK



## GROWTH OF NU WEBSITE

Working to expand library of technologies to support collaboration between complementary verification technology development efforts & increase interactivity of mapping tools.



## CONSTRUCTION OF VR ENVIRONMENTS

Expanding set of virtual facilities comprising the Nu landscape; developing capabilities to run and evaluate inspection simulations in support of government-to-government and research community collaboration.



## INTEGRATION OF NU AND VR

Further integration of Nu and VR to develop verification option sets from both a both a broad, birds-eye view and a detailed facility-level view.



